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resolve the case at hand. In Sibbach v. 
Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), the Court 
"observed that federal courts, in adopt-
ing rules were not free to extend or 
restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a 
statute." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1079. 
Federal courts, therefore, cannot adopt 
rules which modify the judicial power 
granted by Article III of the United 
States Constitution. 
Willy argued that the district court 
had overreached the judicial power 
granted by Article III by imposing 
Rule 11 sanctions in a case absent 
subject matter jurisdiction. ''Thus, 
according to petitioner, even had Con-
gress attempted to grant the courts 
authority to impose sanctions in a case 
such as this, the grant would run afoul 
of Article IlL" Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 
1079. Willy conceded that there are 
circumstances in which federal courts 
without subject matter jurisdiction may 
impose sanctions. Nevertheless, he 
contended that federal courts may not 
take such action "against a party who 
has successfully contested jurisdiction." 
Id. at 1079. The Court, however, rea-
soned that "in acknowledging the many 
circumstances in which sanctions can 
be imposed, several which have a statu-
tory basis, petitioner effectively con-
cedes both Congress' general power to 
regulate the courts and its specific 
power to authorize the imposition of 
sanctions." Id. at 1080. 
The Court stated that a federal court 
found lacking subject matter jurisdic-
tion would be precluded from further 
adjudication of the case; ''but such a 
determination does not automatically 
wipe out all proceedings had in the 
district court at a time when the district 
court operated under the misapprehen-
sion that it hadjurisdiction." Id. After 
reviewing other cases, the Court de-
clared that in the interest of maintain-
ing orderly procedure, sanctions should 
be upheld despite a later determination 
that the federal court was without juris-
diction. Id. Furthermore, Rule 11 
sanctions were of collateral concern 
and such sanctions were not an assess-
ment of the legal merits of a case. Id. 
Relying on Cooter & Gellv. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), the Court 
state that "it is well established that a 
federal court may consider collateral 
issues after an action is no longer pend-
ing." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1080 (quot-
ing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. 384). 
Willy supported his claim by citing 
United States Catholic Conference v. 
Abortion Rights Mobilization. Inc., 487 
U.S. 72 (1988), in which the Court 
concluded that if on remand, the dis-
trict court is found to be deficient in 
subject matter jurisdiction, the con-
tempt orders enacted by the district 
court must collapse. Willy, 112 S. Ct. 
at 1089. Based on this decision, Willy 
asserted that Rule 11 sanctions im-
posed by a district court without sub-
ject matter jurisdiction must fall. The 
Court rejected Willy's liberal applica-
tion of Catholic Conference the and 
emphasized the differences in the pur-
pose ofacivil contempt order and Rule 
11 sanctions. 
Since Rule 11 sanctions do not in-
volve the merits of a "case or contro-
versy," a federal court without subject 
matter jurisdiction over a case may 
constitutionally impose procedural 
rules which are collateral to the case at 
hand. Accordingly, parties must ob-
serve procedural rules, such as Rule 
11, when practicing before federal 
courts, whether or not they agree with 
the jurisdiction of that court. 
- Carol Nakhuda Cohen 
Rubin v. State: PROTECTION OF 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI-
LEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO LO-
CATION AND CONDITION OF 
TANGIBLE EVIDENCE RE-
MOVED OR ALTERED BY DE-
FENSE COUNSEL EVEN IF IT IM-
PLICATES THE DEFENDANT. 
In a six to one decision, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that state-
ments made by a defendant in a crimi-
nal case to investigators she had hired 
in a related domestic matter were not 
protected by attorney-client privilege 
until her attorney specifically retained 
the investigators in the criminal mat-
ter. In Rubin v. State, 602 A.2d 677 
(Md. 1992), the court of appeals held a 
private investigator's testimony about 
statements made by the defendant be-
fore her attorney arrived at the murder 
scene did not violate attorney-client 
privilege. However, the court found 
that the investigator's testimony con-
cerning events occurring later violated 
her attorney-client privilege, but was 
harmless error. The court, although 
not explicitly doing so, appeared to 
adopt an exception to the attorney-
client privilege for evidence removed 
or altered by defense counsel. 
Lisa Rubin and Timothy Warner's 
1 O-year marriage was turbulent. It was 
marked by numerous affairs and the 
alleged attempted murder of Rubin's 
ex-lover. In March 1990, Warner 
moved out ofthe couple's home. Sev-
eral days later, Rubin engaged the ser-
vices of Prudential Associates, Inc., a 
private investigating agency, to prove 
that Warner was committing adultery. 
During the course of the investigation, 
Rubin developed a close relationship 
with Robert Miller, Prudential's presi-
dent, and told Miller that Warner had 
admitted to her that he had tried to kill 
her former lover. Millerrecommended 
that Rubin consult with Prudential's 
attorney, Darrel Longest, about a pos-
sible accessoryship problem. Rubin 
subsequently met with Longest and 
retained him to represent her. 
On April 23, 1990, Warner tele-
phoned Rubin concerning their dog. 
They agreed to meet at the 
veterinarian's office the following 
evening. After meeting at a parking 
lot, Rubin and Warner walked down a 
path through a wooded area. There, 
Rubin shot Warner nine times with a 
.38 caliber pistol, reloading twice in 
the process. Rubin then called Miller 
and arranged to meet him, without 
telling him the purpose ofthe meeting. 
Miller, along with an associate, 
Leopold, met Rubin and she subse-
quently led them to the murder site. 
Only after talking to Rubin and exam-
ining the scene did Miller call attorney 
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Longest. After Longest arrived, he 
advised the investigators not to discuss 
the events because they were working 
as his agents on this matter. The fol-
lowing day, Leopold made a statement 
to the police. As a result, a search 
warrant was issued for the office of 
Longest. The murder weapon was 
found in the attorney's office along 
with an envelope containing six .22 
caliber bullets. 
Rubin filed a motion to suppress all 
communications between the investi-
gators, the attorneys and herself on the 
basis of attorney-client privilege. The 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
held that the attorney-client relation-
ship did not arise with respect to 
Warner's murder until Longest arrived 
at the scene. Rubin, 602 A.2d at 683. 
Later, during the trial, Leopold testi-
fied that after meeting with Longest, 
he had observed some .22 caliber bul-
lets in Rubin's handbag. This testi-
mony discredited Rubin's self-defense 
theory that Warner had pulled a .22 
pistol on her. Id. at 690. Rubin was 
convicted and appealed. The court of 
appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its 
own motion prior to consideration by 
the court of special appeals. 
The first issue concerned when the 
attorney-client privilege arose. The 
court began by describing privileged 
communications as those "made dur-
ing the existence of actual relation of 
attorney and client, or during inter-
views directed thereto, and must relate 
to the subject-matter about which ad-
vice is sought." Id. at 684 (citing 
Harrison v. State, 345 A.2d 202 
(1970». The court then recognized 
that the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege may properly apply to com-
munications between Rubin and the 
Prudential investigators. Rubin, 603 
A.2d at 683. 
Rubin contended that legal repre-
sentation by Longest embraced all as-
pects ofthe relationship between Rubin 
and Warner and that she called Miller 
to "get in touch with Mr. Longest." Id. 
The court held that in applying the 
existing law to the facts, the circuit 
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court was warranted in finding that 
Rubin did not have a reasonable expec-
tation that her conversations with the 
investigators would be protected by 
attorney-client privilege, since neither 
an employer-employee relationship, 
nor an agency relationship existed be-
tween Longest and Prudential prior to 
Longest's arrival at the murder scene. 
Id. at 684. 
The court next addressed Rubin's 
contention that allowing Leopold to 
testify about the bullets he saw in 
Rubin's handbag, after the attorney-
client relationship attached, was error. 
The court stated the general rule that 
when the client is the source ofphysi-
cal evidence delivered by defensecoun-
sel to the prosecution, the source will 
not be disclosed to the jury. Id. at 689. 
In allowing the testimony, the circuit 
court relied on People v. Meredith, 631 
P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Meredith, the 
California court held that "whenever 
defense counsel removes or alters evi-
dence, the [attorney-client] privilege 
does not bar the revelation of the origi-
nal location or condition of the evi-
dence in question," Rubin, 602 A.2d at 
686 (quoting Meredith, 631 P.2d at 
54), even ifthe original location impli-
cates the accused as the source. 
The Meredith exception has been 
held applicable when the defense moves 
tangible evidence from a fixed location 
or alters its condition. The rationale 
behind the exception is that by remov-
ing or altering the evidence, defense 
counsel "deprives the prosecution of 
the opportunity to observe that evi-
dence in its original condition or loca-
tion." Id. (citing Meredith, 631 P.2dat 
53). In analyzing the Meredith excep-
tion, the court first cited a litany of 
cases supporting the general rule that a 
defense attorney must turn over any 
tangible evidence to the prosecution. 
Rubin, 602 A.2d at 686-87. The court 
then stated that when the attorney's 
possession ofthe evidence was a result 
of a client's "intentionally communi-
cativeact or accompanied by, orresult-
ing from, a confidential communica-
tion, the attorney-client privilege is 
implicated." Id. at 687-88. Thus, at 
trial, the original location and condi-
tion of evidence may be disclosed by 
the prosecution, but the source of the 
evidence, the communication from the 
client, may not. 
Previously, the Meredith exception 
had only been applied to removal of 
tangible evidence from a fixed location 
by the defense team based on commu-
nication from the client. Id. at 689. In 
the case sub judice, the State attempted 
to classify moving the .22 caliber bul-
lets from Rubin's handbag to the 
attorney's file cabinet as a Meredith 
alteration. Without specifically adopt-
ing or rejecting Meredith, the court of 
appeals explained that the removal of 
the bullets from the handbag was not 
an alteration of "location" in the sense 
of Meredith, but a separation of ''the 
link between the physical evidence in 
the possession of defense counsel and 
the client source of that evidence," in 
line with the general rule. Id. The 
court found a violation of attorney-
client privilege, but ultimately consid-
ered itto be harmless error, because the 
remaining evidence in the case could 
not give rise to reasonable doubt. 
Although the court of appeals found 
a violation of the protection of attor-
ney-client privilege, this case is sig-
nificant for the limitations that the 
court imposes on that protection. First, 
the court narrowly interpreted when 
the attorney-client relation arises. In 
the future, defendants will have to be 
more careful in discussing events with 
non-attorneys. Second, although the 
court of appeals expanded the scope of 
attorney-client privilege to evidence 
obtained from defense counsel, who 
obtained it based on client informa-
tion, it also adopted an exception to 
this protection. Attorneys in Maryland 
will now have to make a tactical deci-
sion whether to remove and examine 
tangible evidence and risk losing the 
attorney-client privilege associated 
with the location and condition ofthe 
item or to leave the item in place and 
protect observations. 
-Ken Brown 
